In recent years, Congress has attempted to address shortcomings in both the institutional and force modernization of Army EOD. Yet much more remains to be done.
Because improvised explosive devices (IEDs) were often the signature weapons of our adversaries in Iraq and Afghanistan, combat engineers and explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) specialists naturally became icons of the Global War on Terror. The utility of these capabilities, however, is not limited to counterinsurgency and stability operations. Indeed, many of the joint force’s EOD units trace their lineage back to Second World War, when enemy air attacks on civilians in the homeland, artillery and air strikes against key military infrastructure like airfields and ports, and clearing former battlefields as friendly forces advanced all required disposing of unexploded ordnance. All of these tasks—geographically spanning from the frontline to the homeland—would again be required if the United States were to fight another large conflict. Like the rest of the force and consistent with the charge of the Army Chief of Staff, General Randy George, to undertake transformation in contact, Army EOD needs to evolve. Yet there is currently no approved EOD vision statement, similar to the Army Space Vision, to guide those efforts. Rather than sit back and “appreciate the situation,” we should think about the lessons learned of the past while also anticipating the problems to come.
Fortunately, Congress is already aware of the importance of EOD and has made some efforts to address the situation, but a vision for EOD would help focus those legislative efforts toward service priorities and the most dangerous gaps. In recent years, Congress has attempted to address shortcomings in both the institutional and force modernization of Army EOD. Yet much more remains to be done.
We propose the following vision statement for Army EOD: professionals dedicated to rendering safe the explosive ordnance threat, exploiting the post blast event to enable future risk informed execution, informing the maneuver commander’s target package development to prevent explosive ordnance emplacement, sustaining the mental health of EOD leaders and soldiers to fight another day, and evolving the capability to enable the sustained Army/Joint fight. This vision encapsulates over 80 years of experience in the acronym REISE. In German, reise means journey. EOD soldiers are volunteers, who understand and appreciate the risk, and still take the “long walk” (journey) toward danger: “initial success or total failure.” In the next conflict, there will be no time to rediscover lost knowledge, so our current efforts must be focused on the evolution of the Army EOD capability. REISE will communicate what the Army EOD capability must be, to guide both the efforts of external stakeholders like Congress as well as the many internal contributors within the Department of Army toward resourcing the capability and experimenting to increase capacity with the force structure the Army can afford.
Rendering safe the explosive ordnance threat is the core competency of Army EOD. This is the one thing in the vision statement that has never been a matter of debate.
Exploiting is key to getting “Left of the Boom.” Exploitation is a perishable skill and must be exercised operationally or in training. As a recent RAND study found, “EOD missions in future large conflicts will resemble those in previous large conflicts, … providing intelligence on “first seen” military munitions (i.e., munitions that were previously unknown to U.S. forces).” Overlooking exploitation is like a person who stops smoking after a cancer diagnosis rather than not smoking in the first place after being educated of its hazards to personal health. Combat and operational EOD experience has demonstrated a requirement to have EOD soldiers trained in explosive ordnance analysis procedures. Once the battle is joined, EOD experience is finite and once it is gone, it is gone. Just as special forces cannot be massed produced, neither can Army EOD commanders and soldiers.
The conclusion of the TRADOC Operational Environment 2024-2034: Large-Scale Combat Operations states, “To remain ready for a range of operational missions, including LSCO, our soldiers and leaders will need to be ready to think and rapidly adapt to changing conditions to maintain overmatch.” As shown in Ukraine and other locations such as Syria the ability to determine the origin, any modifications to fuzing and firing systems, and enemy method of emplacing explosives are all critical information elements. In the future, exploitation can help attribute responsibility to undeclared belligerents. Ukraine has demonstrated some imaginative approaches, such as adapting commercial unmanned systems to support combat operations.
The Army will not have the luxury of time in any conflict with China, our pacing challenge.
Informing the maneuver commander of explosive ordnance order of battle is essential for both EOD soldiers and operational commanders. The Army will not have the luxury of time in any conflict with China, our pacing challenge. During the war in Afghanistan, in which IEDs were the number one killer of soldiers, it took the Army 107 months to transition from ad hoc organizations to the deployment of the 52nd Ordnance Group (EOD), which provided essential colonel-level command for the counter-IED mission within Combined Joint Task Force-PALADIN. Until then, that critical effort had been led by non-EOD trained commanders and staff. Army EOD groups need to be integrated in planning to ensure they are in theater and physically on the ground to provide mature senior EOD “command” leadership and technical expertise for commanders at all levels.
Sustaining builds resilience for the constant tasks that Army EOD leaders and soldiers must perform. In large-scale combat operations, individuals might have to be ready to serve “for the duration” as during World-War-II. An Air Force historical monograph, Combat Crew Rotation World War II, and Korea, provides some insights in its examination of a group that similarly had to deal with the effects of cumulative stress. The study found that a failure “to diagnose fatigue in its early stages” caused “irreparable harm” to both individuals and to the service when they could no longer be used. EOD soldiers in Afghanistan and Iraq certainly experienced similar problems. In I Lost My Love in Bagdad, journalist Michael Hastings who accompanied an EOD unit for a time wrote of becoming “numb to the threat.” There are only so many adrenaline rushes a human can experience before there is degradation. Although we do now know what the “burn rate” for EOD leaders and soldiers might be in a major war, it is a topic of discussion in news articles, within the EOD Warrior Foundation, and elsewhere in the EOD career field. With all that EOD soldiers will be expected to do in that scenario, we must work to develop better solutions.
Evolving capability is how the EOD vision will ultimately show its worth. In addition to General George’s call for continuous transformation, Army EOD should adopt the Japanese manufacturing philosophy of Kaizen, or continuous improvement. We can also learned from the aviation industry’s crew resource management (CRM) approach to reduce mishaps by looking at the role of the human factor when addressing unforeseen events in a high-risk, high-stress environment. An approved EOD vision statement will help guide and encourage organizational culture changes and integrate EOD expertise into preparing for future challenges from the frontline to the homeland. It will also provide a unified, coherent message to Congress to guide legislation to improve EOD capability. Army EOD commanders and soldiers will have to make the journey: Let it be a well-informed journey.
Frederick L. Corcoran III is a retired U.S. Army lieutenant colonel and Force Management Officer with deployments to Afghanistan, former EOD officer with deployments to Egypt and Kuwait and current Department of the Army Civilian for the U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command. He holds a bachelor’s degree in Forensic Science from Jacksonville State University, an MBA from George Mason University, and an MSS from the U.S. Army War College.
Dick A. Larry is a retired U.S. Army colonel and EOD officer; former division chief, G38 Adaptive Counter-Improvised Explosive Device/EOD Solutions ACES Division, in the HQDA G-3/5/7; and former commander, 79th Ordnance Battalion (EOD) with deployment to Iraq. He holds a bachelor’s degree in public administration from Northern Arizona University and a master’s degree from the Naval War College, MNSS from the Naval War College.
The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command, U.S. Army War College, the U.S. Army, or the Department of Defense.
Photo Description: Soldiers of the 718th Ordnance Company (EOD) take part in a training exercise at Camp Humphreys, Republic of Korea.
Photo Credit: U.S. Army photo by Spc. Matthew Marcellus
