Culture change is hard, possibly the hardest form of change that any large complex organization like a military can undertake.
In 2024, culture change has become a theme among all the services. Army leaders are prioritizing strengthening the profession and instituting a “warfighting culture.” Same with the Air Force, Space Force, and Navy. But culture change is hard, possibly the hardest form of change that any large complex organization like a military can undertake. And as retired army officer and organizational psychologist Lenny Wong hilariously showed in a classic opinion piece, “Changing the Army’s Culture of Cultural Change,” it is much harder than mandating the capitalization of “Soldiers” or appending “of Excellence” to an organizational name.
Even when the culture change is meaningful and brings the organization closer to its espoused values, it is still hard. Consider some common themes addressed by senior leaders pushing for a “warfighting culture”: physical, mental, emotional, and spiritual resilience; capability and capacity to perform assigned missions through realistic training, professional education, etc.; placing the mission before self; and fighting legally, ethically, and honorably in accordance with the laws of land warfare. Why must such obvious things require the most senior leaders to personally reinforce them? Shouldn’t everyone “get it” already? Or at least most everyone?
My answer is because leaders have long misunderstood culture change. I will offer three of the most common “perils” of culture change here, noting they are just three among dozens that I’ve encountered over my professional life. I will also offer some ways to mitigate these perils, but that is far easier said than done. Sorry, there will be no silver bullets here.
And that leads me to the first peril. The “silver bullet” mindset, in which leaders assume there’s one simple thing they can do from which the desired culture change will naturally follow. This mindset typically occurs when leaders are under pressure and lack the time to invest in the messy process of doing culture change. They may succeed in superficially embedding the desired culture through their messages, but the necessary reinforcement is left to someone else. Unfortunately, this can result in the vision being lost as subordinate leaders garble the message, ignore it, or pursue their own preferred message.
The second peril is a similar dynamic but in relation to the ends—the myth of the “strong culture.” Strong cultures are those in which everyone enacts the desired norms, values, procedures, and ethos in the same way. A well-known example comes from NASA in the 1960s, when a janitor proclaimed, “I’m not mopping the floors, I’m putting a man on the moon!” The statement, and the proud sentiments accompanying it, demonstrates both commitment to the organization and placing high value on individual contributions from everyone, regardless of status.
Such cultures can seem appealing to militaries because they align with traditional conceptions of good order and discipline. However, strong cultures are not necessarily good things. In fact, they can be quite dangerous. In a famous study of a 1990s tech firm, Gideon Kunda showed how toxic a centrally-managed and imposed strong culture can become. Workers were expected to subordinate their very being to the company. Maintaining any sort of personal life was treated as disloyalty. Deviation from company messaging was not tolerated. This was a case of demanding absolute submission rather than compliance. Hence, the pursuit of a stronger culture should allow for some variation and avoid harmful conformity.
The third peril occurs when commanders are charged with the responsibility for the culture within their units yet lack any influence over the greatest barriers to culture change. A research project by Army War College students participating in the Carlisle Scholars Program identified eight such barriers: complacency due to disempowered leaders, liability avoidance, ambivalence, or resistance to change; excessive administrative complexity; overly restrictive rules of engagement; overcommitment of units; over-reliance on enterprise technological solutions that are slow in fielding and do not work; perverse incentives discouraging desired behaviors; existing unsolved climate problems; and inconsistent top-down messaging. Those barriers often emanate from “on high,”—joint and service staffs major commands, or similar entities.
Concerns about over-bureaucratization of the armed forces have been voiced for decades. Don Snider’s seminal works on military professionalism show how “obedient” bureaucracies undermine military professionalism. Lenny Wong and Steve Gerras have shown how the accumulation of administrative demands rob commanders of their capacity to perform basic command tasks like managing training, leading soldiers, and developing future leaders.
When we put these three perils together, we end up with precisely what Wong poked fun at—a centralized, bureaucratized effort to impose an engineered culture change that too many members do not identify with. But the supposed antidotes to these perils—invest more time, be more flexible, and empower commanders more— do not necessarily lead to better culture change. The pressures that leaders are under to fix culture problems tempt them to rely on magical, silver-bullet solutions. Those same pressures also mean that leaders often devote energy to culture change for a limited time until distracted later by other requirements. The problem might go away for a moment, but it comes back.
To increase the chances of successfully changing culture, leaders need to understand three truths about culture change. Not all leaders will be comfortable with these truths.
The first truth is that bad habits are rarely broken. Rather, they are weakened over time until the organization is postured to cease using them. One may deem a process, system, structure, or other cultural artifact to be ineffective, inefficient, inappropriate, or wrong and therefore should be eliminated. Consider the recurrent problem of excessive mandatory training requirements and efforts to keep them at feasible levels so soldiers and commanders are not overwhelmed. One might find something to drop off, however new requirements eventually get added back and the Army soon finds itself back where it was before, with too much mandatory training! Instead, weakening bad habits is done by applying sustained pressure. This may mean changing the message on occasion as the situation changes.
Some may become confused.
Yet changing the message can be risky if members are not primed for it. Some may become confused. Thus, the second truth of culture change is the importance of helping members through the transition to the new culture, including preparedness for handling the inevitable challenges as they arise. Transition is the mental and emotional state that members undergo when letting go of the old and embracing the new. But what seems a simple movement is anything but. Scholars on transitions have pointed out the disquieting gap that comes about when the old ways have been broken but the new ones are still taking hold or under construction. The gap gets wider when change efforts inevitably hit snags—the new software is delayed or the division of responsibilities among new offices is unclear—that potentially create confusion or uncertainty. A good transition plan warns members of what to expect, so the reaction is not one of incapacitating surprise but anticipation, proactive resolution, and continued movement forward. Not having a good plan can result in members being so uncomfortable and anxious in the middle of the effort, that they might get disillusioned or revert to the old familiar ways just to restore stability.
The third truth is that culture change often takes a contorted path from the current to the desired future state. An example I like to use is the “diet rollercoaster” that all too many of us know. The aim is to come in full compliance with the new ways (i.e., x fewer pounds). For most, the first step is instituting some new diet and exercise regimen, leading to the quick loss of water weight. Feeling good, the subject relaxes, and then in horror realizes that they gained some weight back. Renewed efforts are followed by plateauing and cravings. Progress looks like two steps forward, two steps back. Maybe the subject decides that the goal was too lofty and changes it (i.e., instead of x, maybe x/2 is okay). The result is a constant internal negotiation over the unacceptable current state and finding a feasible and acceptable goal, which may or might never be achieved.
I call it the “push” method of culture change because it describes when leaders try to push the organization out of the current state regardless of the consequences such as during crisis—e.g., sexual harassment and assault or information assurance and cybersecurity. The desired state may be easy to articulate, such as zero incidents, but members may differ on how that is operationalized. Also, the goals may shift due to unforeseen challenges or learning more about what works and what does not. Meanwhile, future major incidents may constitute a significant reversal of progress, causing leaders to take a different path to the goal. The onus is on leaders to keep persistent and not give up, especially as the organization’s current state remains unacceptable.
But what if the desired future state is clearer than the current state? The current discourse on warfighting culture is a good example. The characteristics of the desired culture are clear and understandable, easy to communicate, and generally unambiguous. The problem is that the current state is characterized by diffusion over how all the parts of the organization see themselves in that culture. Some may believe they have instituted a warfighting culture, so there’s little to do. Others may not see the culture as relevant to them and avoid getting involved. Still others may worry if the culture change is going to marginalize their contributions to the organization or pull resources away. For warfighting cultures, the operating force is more likely to jump on board, but what does it mean to the generating force, garrisons, family members, technical specialists, and others outside the combat arms mold? Where do they fit?
The “pull” method of culture change applies to this situation. Consider this metaphor instead of the diet: the organization is like a tractor-trailer and all the leaders of the various parts of the organization are pulling together on a rope tied to the bumper. For the organization to move forward, everyone has to see themselves in the culture. The desired future state must therefore be described as a set of principles or expectations that each part of the organization regardless of role, status, etc. can adopt the culture as appropriate to suit their unique missions and contributions to the organization, so long as they do not prevent the organization’s eventual achievement of the desired future state. For “pull” to work, subordinate leaders at all levels must feel empowered to contribute. Everyone must have a role to play.
I promised no silver bullet solutions, and sadly I kept that promise. For culture change to succeed, it requires continuous commitment and persistence, diligence in shifting away from bureaucratic approaches toward command-centered ones, and acceptance that there will be setbacks and reversals. Above all, culture change is a human endeavor, and compliance measures like mandatory training are only indicators of progress not necessarily true progress, which is found only in the hearts and minds of those we lead.
Be sure to check out the recently released White Paper produced by the AY24 Carlisle Scholars Program, A Proposed Framework for Expanding and Sustaining a Culture of Warfighting in the Army (White Paper)
Tom Galvin is Associate Professor of Resource Management in the Department of Command Leadership and Management as well as the leadership and management instructor for the Carlisle Scholars Program at the United States Army War College. He is the author of the monograph Leading Change in Military Organizations and companion Experiential Activity Book.
The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. Army War College, the U.S. Army, or the Department of Defense.
Photo Description: Col. Curtis Taylor, commander of the 5th Security Force Assistance Brigade, addresses Soldiers of the 5th SFAB following a beret donning ceremony in front of “The Infantryman” memorial at Joint Base Lewis-McChord, Washington, July 16, 2019. The brown color of the beret traces back through the history of the role in the Army and represents “the muddy boots reality of our mission as advisers,” said Taylor. “Your job is to be in the mud leading soldiers.” Serving in an SFAB is a voluntary assignment which recruits the most highly-qualified applicants and trains them extensively in languages, foreign weapons systems, communications and other military skills to better advise and assist partner nation forces in combined arms warfare.
Photo Credit: U.S. Army photo by Spc. John Weaver